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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal transferred from 
the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Johnson generally accepts Higley's statement of issues.1 Johnson objects to 
Higley's statement of the standard of review as being incomplete.2 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
To prevail on a challenge to a court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard, a party must first marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and then 
demonstrate the findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of 
the evidence. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (Utah 1998).3 If the 
party fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court need not even address the factual 
challenge. Bailev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet 945 P.2d 180, 196 (Utah App. 1997). 
higley's statement of issue 2 incorrectly presumes "there was no evidence of 
reservoir use when Higley took title to the property." The evidence showed, and the 
judge found, active use of the reservoir at that time. The same problem appears in 
statement of issue 3 where each subparagraph is premised on a factual claim by Higley 
that was contrary to the weight of the evidence and rejected by the trial court. 
2For simplicity, Appellees will be referred to herein jointly as "Johnson" and 
Appellants jointly as "Higley," both in the masculine singular. 
3Higley cites to an earlier version of Valcarce v. Fitzgerald published at 331 
Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Utah 1997). Johnson's citations herein will be to the 1998 
opinion. 
1 
Where there are mixed questions of law and fact, the factual questions are 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard while the "trial court's application of law 
to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Platts v. Parents Helping Parents. 947 
P.2d 658, 661 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). This is particularly true to a finding with 
respect to the existence of an easement. 
The finding that an easement exists is a conclusion of law. 
Such a finding is, however, the type of highly fact-
dependent question, with numerous potential fact patterns, 
which accords the trial judge a broad measure of discretion 
when applying the correct legal standard to the given set of 
facts. We therefore overturn the finding of an easement 
only if we find that the trial judge's decision exceeded the 
broad discretion granted. 
Valcarce v. Fitgerald at 24 (citation omitted). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions determinative of the issues in 
this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Johnson and Higley are long-time residents of Grantsville in Tooele County. 
They grew up in Grantsville and for all of that time a series of dikes remained on the 
property in question creating a reservoir known as the "Wrathall-Johnson Reservoir" or 
the "Blue Lakes." Johnson and Higley own adjoining ranches. Johnson owns water 
storage easements and improvements on property Higley purchased in 1990.4 When 
4As discussed below, there are two express grants of easement which will be 
jointly referred to in this brief as the "Easement." The term will also subsequently be 
used to describe the prescriptive easement which is an alternative theory to establish his 
rights in place of the express easement grants. 
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Higley purchased this land, a title report and policy of insurance was prepared for him 
that expressly states the land is subject to a water storage easement created by deed in 
1946. Tr. Exh. 22. A copy of the title report is attached hereto under Tab 1; the 
Easement is mentioned in paragraph 11. The dikes creating the reservoir were obvious 
from a visual inspection of the property, and stored water was present and being used 
by Johnson. Five years later Higley began to intentionally interfere with Johnson's 
rights. Johnson initiated this action against Higley to enjoin Higley's interference with 
that Easement and to obtain damages for flooding caused by Higley's negligence. 
Higley counterclaimed, alleging Johnson was stealing Higley's water and interfering 
with a ditch serving the Higley property. Higley did not join the other ditch owners as 
co-counterclaimants. 
Four months after the filing of the Verified Complaint, Higley made a motion to 
compel joinder of indispensable parties or alternatively to dismiss Johnson's complaint. 
After briefing and oral argument, the court determined that (1) based on the nature of 
Johnson's claims, which arise "solely out of the alleged conduct of the defendants" and 
(2) the fact that Johnson sought no relief against other parties, joinder of additional 
parties was not required. R. 436-38. 
During trial Higley and Johnson had completely different stories regarding the 
history of their dispute, requiring that the trial court weigh the testimony and judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. After five days of trial testimony, the court ruled in favor 
of Johnson on all of his claims and decided appropriate damages. The court ruled 
against Higley on his counterclaims because he failed to offer even a shred of evidence. 
Both sides submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 461-498; 
3 
499-512. The trial court modified Johnson's version of the findings in certain respects 
and directed Johnson to resubmit proposed findings and conclusions. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment were subsequently entered on January 9, 1998 (a 
copy is attached hereto under Tab 2). In its findings, the court expressly stated that the 
testimony in support of Johnson's claims was more credible than the testimony 
presented by Higley. Higley did not object, in form or substance, to the findings, 
conclusions and Judgment. He subsequently initiated an appeal to the Supreme Court 
limiting his appeal to the decisions on Johnson's complaint, but not appealing the trial 
court's ruling against his counterclaims. The appeal was subsequendy assigned to this 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Johnson owns 640 acres of real property in Tooele County known as the 
Johnson Ranch. The Johnson Ranch was originally owned by his grandfather, then 
passed down to his father and then to Johnson. R. 12-14. The Johnson Ranch lies 
adjacent to property owned by Higley. R. 23-34. 
2. Included in the Johnson Ranch are 192.5 acres of land that has been 
irrigated continuously since at least 1950 with water from Blue Lakes reservoir. R, 16-
26; 368; 450; 536. 
3. An irrigation ditch connects and carries water from Blue Lakes reservoir 
to the Johnson Ranch. It is obvious and has been used continuously by Johnson for at 
least the last 30 years. R. 450. 
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4. The reservoir, its impounding dikes and all other related improvements 
have existed for at least 50 years without challenge from the owners of the land 
encumbered by the Easement. R. 16-26; 368; 450; 536. 
5. Johnson owns water rights of record with the office of the Utah State 
Engineer which include the right to take water from Fishing Creek and water 
discharged from the Grantsville City sewer lagoons for storage in Blue Lakes reservoir. 
R. 23; Tr. Exh. 16. The State Engineer's office water rights expert for Tooele County 
testified that the only valid water storage right for Blue Lakes is owned by Johnson. 
R. 150. 
6. Blue Lakes inundates portions of land owned by Higley and by Grantsville 
City. R. 23; 536. 
7. Grantsville City was not made a party to Johnson's action because the 
City acknowledges Johnson's Easement. R. 78, 536. 
8. The Easement was originally acquired by Paul E. Wrathall under two 
separate written instruments because the underlying land was owned by two different 
families. The first deed is dated January 15, 1946, with J. Keim Brown and Elba H. 
Brown as grantors and the second dated March 1, 1946, with Penina W. Anderson as 
grantor. These deeds have been a matter of public record in the Tooele County 
Recorder's office since 1946. R. 13-14; 535; also enclosed in Appellant's Brief as 
Addendum 2. 
9. The deeds created binding obligations on Brown and Anderson. Higley 
and Grantsville City are successors to Brown and Anderson. They do not claim to be 
successors to the grantee under Easement. 
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10. The Easement grant is broad and unconditional: 
J. KEITH BROWN and ELBA H. BROWN, his wife, 
GRANTORS of Grantsville, Tooele County, State of Utah, 
hereby give, grant and transfer to PAUL E. WRATH ALL, 
his successors in interest and assigns, GRANTEE, of the 
same place, for and in consideration of the sum of $1.00 and 
other good and valuable consideration, have granted, 
bargained, transfered [sic] and delivered and by these 
presents do grant, bargain, transfer and deliver unto PAUL 
E. WRATH ALL, his successors in interest and assigns, an 
unconditional easement and right in and to the following 
described real property in Tooele County, State of Utah, to 
wit: 
for the purpose of storing water thereupon, giving and 
granting unto the said PAUL E. WRATHALL, his 
successors in interest and assigns, the unconditional 
easement and use of so much of said above described land as 
will be covered and occupied by the storage of water therein 
and thereon, sufficient to contain waters run thereupon [in] 
the natural course thereof, in storing said water, together 
with the right of ingress and egress necessary for the full 
and complete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement 
hereby granted and all rights and privileges incident thereto 
including the right to build, repair and maintain said storage 
reservoir or other use of said water. 
This easement shall be in force and effect perpetually. 
R. 13-14 (property description of grantor's land subject to innundation omitted). 
11. Presently the land area covered with water when the reservoir is full is 85 
acres, which is significantly less than the 240 acres of land that could be flooded 
according to the recorded Easement. R. 534; Tr. Exh. 18. 
12. There is no restriction in the Easement language which requires that the 
water be used on any particular tract of land. The Easement was not expressly made 
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appurtenant to the grantee's land. The Easement contemplates the possibility of an 
assignment by referring to assignees and successors. 
13. On May 14, 1946, Paul E. Wrathall sold an undivided joint interest in the 
Easement, the dam and dikes, to Johnson's father, Maxwell Anderson Johnson for 
$1,240. R. 8-11, 535; also enclosed in Appellant's Brief as Addendum 3. The 
agreement was not recorded since the encumbrances on the underlying land already 
existed by virtue of the two previously executed deeds from Brown and Anderson. 
14. A comprehensive decree was entered by the Third District Court in 
Tooele County on September 28, 1950. Among other things, the decree confirmed the 
Easement rights of Johnson's father and his right to use water from Blue Lakes. Max 
Johnson, Wrathall, Brown, and Anderson were parties to the action. Paragraph 6 of 
the court's findings of fact refer to and confirm an agreement among Max Johnson, 
Wrathall, Brown, and Anderson that acknowledges the Johnson right to store water. 
Paragraph 9 refers to the storage facilities at Blue Lakes: 
Said Blue Lakes consist of two natural ponds which have 
been enlarged and improved so that they will store water; 
that one of said ponds is southwest from the other and both 
are located in Section 20, as of . . . that the plaintiffs 
Johnson have a right to utilize the Blue Lakes for storage 
purposes, together with the defendants Wrathall. . .5 
R. 22-23; Tr. Exh. 10. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are enclosed in 
Appellant's Brief as Addendum 4. 
5Higley refers to a stricken paragraph 6 in the court's conclusions of law for the 
proposition that the Johnson/Wrathall agreement was somehow "undercut" or 
restricted. Higley errs. Paragraph 6, if not deleted, merely would have given Maxwell 
Johnson the right to transport water through the "west ditch." 
7 
15. Johnson acquired the Johnson Ranch, the Easement and the ditch works 
and related appurtenances in 1980 upon the death of Max Johnson. R. 22, 537; 
Tr. Exhs. 3 and 5. 
16. As long as anyone can remember and for at least 30 years prior to trial, 
Johnson and his father have used and maintained the Easement and appurtenances. 
R. 14, 27, (testimony of Russell Johnson); R. 450 (testimony of George C. "Cory" 
Brown); R. 600 (testimony of Sherman Higley); R. 372 (testimony of Alan Johnson). 
17. Grantsville is a small community and over the years Johnson's interest 
was so commonly known that the Grantsville community referred to the reservoir as the 
"Wrathall-Johnson Reservoir." R. 368, 449, 534. 
18. The use of the Blue Lakes reservoir as an irrigation and flood control 
device required the construction of dikes-one known as the West Dike and the other as 
the North Dike. Construction took place in or about 1946 without objection from the 
servient estate owners. Design and construction plans of the Blue Lakes reservoir were 
approved by the U. S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservancy Service and 
submitted to the office of the Utah State Engineer in 1946. Those plans have been on 
file with the State Engineer's office since 1946. R. 157, 535; Tr. Exh. 18. 
19. Higley was "raised and lived in Grantsville until he was 39 years old, or 
until about early 1981." Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 497. He worked "in the Grantsville 
area all his life, even after his marriage." Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 747. "He has 
been in the business of raising cattle and farming all his life." Appellant's Brief p. 8; 
R. 497-98. Higley knew, at the time of his purchase, of the existence of the Blue 
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Lakes reservoirs and dikes, Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 498, and had "been familiar 
with the Blue Lakes for most of his life . . . " Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 759. 
20. In or about 1986, Johnson learned that in addition to an Easement he 
needed a state-approved water right in order to store water in Blue Lakes. At this same 
time, Johnson performed work on the reservoir to bring it into compliance with the 
State Engineer's dam safety regulations. No third party claimed ownership or 
participated in these repairs. R. 30-35, 534. 
21. Higley acquired his property in 1990 subject to all easements actual or of 
record or that might be apparent upon inspection of the surface. R. 1-6, 533. Prior to 
the purchase, he obtained a title insurance policy which disclosed the Easement as an 
encumbrance on the land and as an exception to the title policy of insurance. 
Tr. Exh. 22. Higley also knew that Johnson's irrigation ditch was the only ditch 
accessing Blue Lakes. R. 450, 502. 
22. Water has been stored in the Blue Lakes reservoir continuously over the 
years since 1946. The timing of storage and the releases of water for flood control and 
irrigation use by Johnson and his father varied from year to year depending on water 
availability, climatic conditions and crop needs. The use of the reservoir was at all 
times open, adverse and under a claim of right. R. 372, 450, 533. 
23. The court found that Higley's theory that his brother, Rulon Higley, owns 
the Easement was not supported by credible evidence. Rulon Higley made no effort to 
use the reservoir, no effort to participate in the repairs performed by Russell Johnson, 
and he has never obtained a water storage filing from the State Engineer's office. He 
sat by and watched Johnson use the reservoir and make repairs. His claim to an 
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interest in the Easement was not made known to anyone until he testified at trial based 
on advice by Higley's attorney that he should claim to be the owner. R. 533, 680-682 
(Rulon Higley's testimony). 
24. Rulon Higley never used water from Blue Lakes. He testified that he had 
no deed to evidence title and had no knowledge of whether any of his land was part of 
the Wrathall acreage irrigated by storage water. R. 680. The court found that Higley 
was using his brother, Rulon, to excuse Higley's actions in interfering with Johnson's 
lawful use of the reservoir. R. 532. 
25. In June of 1995 Higley filed a water right application in an attempt to get 
the Utah State Engineer's approval to store and use water from Blue Lakes. Johnson 
filed a protest and the State Engineer did not approve Higley's application. R. 22, 151. 
26. Higley decided, without approval of the State Engineer or of Johnson, to 
put his water in the Blue Lakes reservoirs and deprive Johnson of needed storage 
capacity. Higley admitted knowing that his conduct interfered with Johnson's vested 
water right. R. 521, 682, 683. 
27. In August of 1996, on directions from Higley, a backhoe operator ran a 
ditch into Blue Lakes, destroyed Johnson's ditch works and drained the reservoir 
contents so that Higley could use the stored water on his property. R. 77, 78, 79, 522, 
523,532,699. 
28. Higley was responsible for handling water matters for the pipeline owners 
and well owners. R. 686, 687. 
29. Higley was aware of flooding problems related to the pipeline installation 
and took no action whatsoever to solve the problem until three months later. R. 554, 
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689, 690. He also was aware of and failed to remove a blockage on the Higley ditch 
which would have alleviated flooding from the pipeline. R. 149, 690, 691. 
30. Higley is a licensed well driller and had a duty to cap the wells during 
winter months to avoid flooding and he failed to do so. R. 165, 166, 561. 
31. Johnson was subjected to repeated flooding events for several years as a 
direct result of Higley attempting to irrigate during the winter months. R. 531. To 
resolve this flooding, Higley designed and installed a pipeline across Johnson's 
property. R. 531. 
32. Higley ran Steven St. Clair's farm and Rulon Higley relied on his brother 
to handle water-related matters. R. 373, 374, 596, 686, 687. 
33. Higley admitted during direct testimony that he determined the diameter 
of the pipeline that flooded Johnson's property. R. 563, 568. 
34. The proximate cause of the first flooding events includes: (1) the failure 
to maintain the Higley ditch in which Higley owns a l/6th interest; and (2) the 
improper sizing of the pipeline. 
35. The proximate cause of the second flooding events includes: (1) Higley's 
use of water during the winter without a valid water right to do so; (2) Higley having 
sized the pipeline too small to handle the flows; and (3) Higley's failure to take any 
action to remedy the flooding after having been notified. R. 529, 530. 
36. No actions of Johnson contributed to the flood damages, and he did not 
fail to mitigate damages. R. 530. 
37. Johnson was awarded the following damages against Higley: 
a. $2,702 for the January and March 1996 flooding event; 
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b. $5,200 for the November 1996 flooding event; and 
c. $3,000 for the loss of storage water and interference with their 
rights in the Blue Lakes reservoir. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In a challenge to a trial court's factual findings, an appellant must marshal all of 
the evidence in support of those findings and demonstrate that the evidence fails to 
support the findings. It is insufficient to stand on contradictory testimony or simply 
point out evidence which favors an opposite ruling. The trial court has considerable 
discretion and is better situated to weigh the evidence and evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses. Higley does not attempt to marshal the evidence. Instead, he cites 
repeatedly to testimony supporting his case. This Court should, therefore, adopt the 
trial court's findings and then proceed to a review of the legal conclusions based on 
those facts. 
The original easement grant in the property now owned by Higley was an 
express and unlimited grant of an easement in gross. The grantor simply did not 
restrict the grantee's use of reservoir water to a particular tract of land. Because the 
easement in gross was personal in character, it was properly transferable by way of 
assignment. The language of the deed specifically states it shall be binding on assigns. 
Johnson's father, therefore, acquired a valid and enforceable contractual interest in the 
Easement. This Easement was properly passed to Johnson on the death of his father. 
The rights of Johnson's father to the Easement were confirmed by the 1950 
adjudication. Higley's predecessors were party to that decree. 
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At no time did Johnson or his father abandon the Easement. Johnson testified 
that the easement was a critical feature for his successful ranching operations and that 
he never intended to abandon his rights. 
Despite Higley's arguments that he is a bona fide purchaser without notice, the 
undisputed evidence showed just the opposite. His title report disclosed the Easement. 
The reservoir was there and in use when Higley inspected the property. The only ditch 
leading from the reservoir went directiy to Johnson's ranch. 
Assuming that Maxwell Johnson acquired no rights under the agreement with 
Wrathall, the only explanation for his continued use is that it was without right and 
adverse. The court found all of the elements of a prescriptive easement had been met. 
A valid easement on Higley's property has been established by prescription. 
The trial court also properly found that Higley's complete failure to introduce 
any evidence to show he owned an interest in the Easement or the improvements owned 
by Johnson precludes his use of the reservoir. Further, Higley has not acquired the 
necessary water right permits from the State Engineer's office to store water in the 
reservoir. The court properly enjoined Higley from storing water in the Blue Lakes 
reservoir or otherwise interfering with Johnson's use of his easement. 
Higley has failed to meet the marshaling requirement to challenge any of the trial 
court's finding. This is particularly true with respect to liability for the flood damage 
to Johnson's property. The court found it was Higley's conduct and not ownership to 
ditches or wells that caused the flooding. Because Higley failed to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of evidence in support of this finding, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's decision. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
I. fflGLEY FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN HIS 
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT. THIS 
COURT SHOULD, THEREFORE, DECLINE TO ADDRESS THOSE 
FACTUAL CHALLENGES. 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be 
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
To prevail on a challenge to a court's findings of fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard, "[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in 
support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (Utah 1998) (citations 
omitted). The appellant is required to marshal all of the evidence supporting the trial 
court's findings before attempting to demonstrate the insufficiency of the evidence. 
Kunz & Co. v. State Dept. of Transp.. 949 P.2d 763, 765 (Utah App. 1997). See also 
Bailev-Allen Co.. Inc. v. Kurzet. 945 P.2d 180, 196 (Utah App. 1997) (party 
challenging findings must marshal all evidence supporting the findings); Macris & 
Associates. Inc. v. Images & Attitude. Inc.. 941 P.2d 636, 642 (Utah App. 1997) 
(same). Extracting meager portions of the evidence and characterizing it as 
insufficient fails to satisfy the marshaling requirement. Macris & Associates at 642. 
Once me evidence is marshaled, the appellant must then meet the clear error 
standard. Arguing mat the trial court should have believed one party's evidence rather 
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than the other's will not do. Gardner v. Madsen. 949 P.2d 785, 790 (Utah App. 
1997). 
When there is conflicting evidence, we defer to the trial 
court as factfinder. The existence of conflicting evidence 
does not give rise to clear error as long as evidence supports 
the trial court's decision. 
Id. A trial court is not required to state each reason leading to its factual findings nor 
to marshal the evidence in support of those findings. State in the Interest of S.T.. 928 
P.2d 393, 398 (Utah App. 1996). The marshaling burden lies squarely with the 
appellant. 
The deference to the trial court in its findings of fact is based in large part on the 
"due consideration given to the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." 
Rule 52(a), Utah R. Civ. P. 
[A] trial court is not required to explain why it found certain 
witnesses less credible or why some testimony was given 
less weight or considered irrelevant. See In re Estate of 
Bartell, 716 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989) (noting appellate 
courts give great deference to trial court's findings of fact, 
especially when they are based on evaluation of conflicting 
live testimony). 
State in the Interest of S.T. at 399. "Trial courts are granted wide discretion in making 
factual findings because the trial court is 'considered to be in the best position to assess 
the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole, 
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold record.'" Poulsen v. 
Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 742-43 (Utah App. 1997) (addressing claim that biased trial court 
ignored testimony of appellant's witnesses). It is well settled that "an appellate court 
will not second-guess a trial court on issues of witness credibility." Sorenson v. 
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Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah App. 1994). See also 
Homer v. Smith. 866 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah App. 1993) (trial court may even properly 
disregard uncontroverted testimony if not credible). 
In the present case, there was conflicting testimony on nearly every factual issue. 
On balance, the court found the evidence offered by Johnson far outweighed that 
presented by Higley. The trial court specifically found that credibility was a significant 
factor throughout the trial. Finding No. 15 states that "Defendants' claim that Arthur 
Higley stored water in Blue Lakes under a claim of right asserted by his brother, Rulon 
Higley, is not supported by credible evidence." R. 533 (emphasis added). Finding 
No. 38 states that "Defendants failed to offer anv credible evidence in support of their 
counterclaims." R. 528 (emphasis added). "To the extent the oral testimonies in this 
action were conflicting as to material issues of fact, on balance the Court finds the 
testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses more credible." Finding No. 39, R. 528.6 
If the party fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court need not even 
address the factual challenge. Kunz & Co. at 765. See also Timm v. Dewsnup. 921 
P.2d 1381, 1391 (Utah 1996) ("an appellant must properly marshal the evidence to 
permit review of the trial court's findings."); Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates. 910 
P.2d 1252, 1260 (Utah App. 1996) (declining to question trial court's application of 
discovery rule and accepting related facts as valid where marshaling requirement not 
met). Where questions of law are involved, the court will assume that the record 
supports the findings and move on to a review of the trial court's legal conclusions and 
6Higley did not object before the trial court to either the form or substance of 
these findings. 
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application of facts to the law. Heber City Corp. v. Simpson. 942 P.2d 307, 312 (Utah 
1997). 
All of Higley's issues on appeal, in whole or in part, challenge the trial court's 
findings of fact. In view of (1) the deference given the trial court to weigh the facts 
and judge credibility of witnesses and (2) Higley's failure to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and demonstrate its insufficiency, those factual challenges 
should fail as a matter of law. 
Because Higley has failed to properly marshal the evidence and demonstrate the 
insufficiency of that evidence in support of the findings of fact, this Court should 
decline to address his factual challenges and should accept the findings of the trial 
court. This leaves only the Court's evaluation of the trial court's application of law to 
those facts. 
H. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE 
ORIGINAL 1946 EASEMENTS ARE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE 
AGAINST HIGLEY. 
There is no dispute that the original deeds by Penina W. Anderson and J. Keith 
and Elba H. Brown were valid grants of easements and were recorded against the 
underlying property in the office of the Tooele County Recorder. It is undisputed that 
the term of the grant was perpetual. It is likewise undisputed that the grant contained 
no restrictions on ownership or against assignments of the Easement. 
17 
A. THE ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS IN THE 1946 EASEMENT WAS 
VALID AND LEGALLY EFFECTIVE. 
Higley's arguments with respect to the 1946 assignment of rights in the 
Easement assume with no analysis that the Easement was an easement appurtenant to a 
particular piece of real property. It is, in fact, an easement in gross, an interest which 
may be transferred without conveyance of real property. 
An easement in gross grants to the holder the right to enter and make use of the 
property of another for a particular purpose. Warburton v. Virginia Beach Federal 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 899 P.2d 779, 781 (Utah App. 1995). An easement in gross is not 
tied to a particular piece of real property, but is a personal interest in the use of 
another's property. Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062, 1066 (Utah 1984). 
In an irrigation case, Abbott v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131. 808 P.2d 1289 
(Idaho 1991), the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed the difference between an easement 
appurtenant and an easement in gross. 
An easement. . . "appurtenant" is one whose benefits serve 
a parcel of land. More exactiy, it serves the owner of that 
land in a way that cannot be separated from his rights in the 
land. It in fact becomes a right in that land and, as we shall 
see, passes with the title. Typical examples of easements 
appurtenant are walkways, driveways, and utility lines 
across Blackacre, leading to adjoining or nearby Whiteacre. 
Easements . . . "in gross" are those whose benefits serve 
their holder only personally, not in connection with his 
ownership or use of any specific parcel of land.... 
Examples are easements for utilities held by utility 
companies, street easements, and railroad easements. 
Abbott at 1298 (quoting from R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck and D. Whitman, 
The Law of Property § 8.2, p. 440 (Hornbook Series Lawyer's Edition (1984)). An 
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easement in gross which is of a commercial character is an interest transferable by 
assignment. Crane v. Crane. 683 P.2d 1062, 1066-67 (Utah 1984). "An easement in 
gross is of a commercial character when the use authorized by it results primarily in 
economic benefit rather than personal satisfaction." Crane at 1067 (citation omitted). 
Where, for example, an easement involves the raising of cattle for profit rather than 
personal use, the easement is of a commercial character. Id. 
Furthermore, where the express easement gives an exclusive or unlimited right 
to use of the easement, the grantee of the easement "may transfer to as many other 
persons as he wishes." Abbott at 1295-96. The theory underlying this rule is that the 
use of the easement by more than the grantee does not impose any additional burden on 
the servient estate. Id. Even if the grant of easement is not exclusive, the easement 
holder can share his easement rights with others so long as the identifiable scope of the 
easement is not exceeded. Id. 
The case law on easements in gross is particularly applicable to water storage 
reservoirs in the arid West. A fundamental water law doctrine is that water should be 
placed to beneficial use. This requires flexibility in where the water is used and for 
what purpose it is used. In keeping with this policy, a reservoir owner should be 
entitled to use the water anywhere and for any beneficial use so long as the servient 
estate owner is not adversely affected. 
The Easement granted to Paul Wrathall in 1946 does not restrict use to a 
dominant estate. In fact, the Easement fails to even mention the land where the water 
will be used: 
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J. KEITH BROWN and ELBA H. BROWN, his wife, 
GRANTORS of Grantsville, Toole County, State of Utah, 
hereby give, grant and transfer to PAUL E. WRATH ALL, 
his successors in interest and assigns, GRANTEE, of the 
same place, for and in consideration of the sum of $1.00 and 
other good and valuable consideration, have granted, 
bargained, transfered [sic] and delivered and by these 
presents do grant, bargain, transfer and deliver unto PAUL 
E. WRATHALL, his successors in interest and assigns, an 
unconditional easement and right in and to the following 
described real property in Tooele County, State of Utah, to 
wit: 
for the purpose of storing water thereupon, giving and 
granting unto the said PAUL E. WRATHALL, his 
successors in interest and assigns, the unconditional 
easement and use of so much of said above described land as 
will be covered and occupied by the storage of water therein 
and thereon, sufficient to contain waters run thereupon [in] 
the natural course thereof, in storing said water, together 
with the right of ingress and egress necessary for the full 
and complete use, occupation and enjoyment of the easement 
hereby granted and all rights and privileges incident thereto 
including the right to build, repair and maintain said storage 
reservoir or other use of said water.7 
The Easement grant contains the phrase "unconditional easement" in two 
locations. It grants the right to "build, repair and maintain" a storage reservoir. It also 
contemplates "other use" of the water stored on the Easement and expressly provides 
for the perpetuity of the Easement. 
7It is important to note that Higley's quotation of this language from the 
Easement omits the phrase "or other use of said water" and includes, without 
explanation, the word "basin." 
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The Easement was and is of a commercial nature because the water stored in and 
taken from the Blue Lakes reservoirs could be used for any purpose. Wrathall could 
have decided to use the water for a flour mill or ice skating rink. Just because Wrathall 
irrigated for a time does not make the Easement tied to land. Where the crops were 
grown was of no interest to the grantor. Mr. WrathaU's assignment to Johnson's father 
of a portion of his rights to use the Easement was a valid and effective transfer of a 
personal interest in die Easement. 
The court found that assignment did not alter the scope of the Easement or 
increase the burden on the servient estate. Higley's claim that new reservoirs were 
added or that new impounding dikes were added to enlarge storage capacity was not 
supported by me evidence. 
B. MAX JOHNSON'S RIGHTS IN THE EASEMENT WERE 
CONFIRMED BY THE 1950 ADJUDICATION AND ARE RES 
JUDICATA. 
In the 1950 litigation, the trial court determined that "plaintiffs Johnson 
[including Max Johnson] have a right to utilize me Blue Lakes for storage purposes, 
together with defendants Wramall . . . " Findings of Fact 1 9, R. 250.8 Higley now 
attempts to resurrect the issue. He infers, without support, that the issue was not fairly 
or fully litigated. He offered no evidence to support this argument at trial. The 
doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes Higley from attacking the 1950 decree. 
8The Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Judgment in 1950 identify the acreage 
Max Johnson irrigated with storage water. This same 192.5 acres are being farmed 
today by Johnson. 
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A branch of res judicata, "[i]ssue preclusion, sometimes referred to as collateral 
estoppel, prevents the parties from relitigating issues resolved in a prior related action." 
Sew v. Security Title Co. of Southern Utah. 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995). 
Application of collateral estoppel is appropriate when: (1) 
the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the 
one presented in the action in question; (2) there was a final 
judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea 
is asserted is a party or is in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication; and (4) the issue in the first case was 
completely, fully, and fairly litigated. 
Glickv. Holden. 889 P.2d 1389, 1391 (Utah App. 1995) (citations omitted). 
The issue of whether Max Johnson possessed an interest in the Easement was 
decided. For over 40 years, nobody claimed that the issue was not completely, fully 
and fairly litigated. Grantsville City recognizes Johnson's Easement and so did 
everyone in Brown and Anderson's chain of title. Collateral estoppel ensures that 
parties can rely on the finality of judgments. Max Johnson and his children relied on 
the 1950 decree, and the continued success of the Johnson Ranch depends on Blue 
Lakes. As a matter of law, Max Johnson, and now his children, have an Easement 
enforceable against Brown, Anderson, and Higley, who succeeded them. 
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C. fflGLEY HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE RECORDED 
EASEMENT. HIGLEY ALSO HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE 
THAT THE RESERVOm WAS IN USE BY JOHNSON. 
Higley was not an outsider coming to Tooele County for the first time. He was 
"raised and lived in Grantsville until he was 39 years old, or until about early 1981." 
Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 497. He worked "in the Grantsville area all his life, even 
after his marriage." Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 747. "He has been in the business of 
raising cattle and farming all his life." Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 497-98. Higley 
knew, at the time of his purchase, of the existence of the Blue Lakes reservoirs and 
dikes. Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 498. He had "been familiar with the Blue Lakes for 
most of his life . . . " Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 759. 
To the extent Higley claims he was unaware of the full extent of Johnson's 
claim, he had a duty to inquire. In dealing with land, a party "who has information or 
facts which would put a prudent person upon an inquiry which, if pursued, would lead 
to actual knowledge as to the state of the title" may be charged with actual notice. 
Diversified Equities. Inc. v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 739 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 
App. 1987) (citing Johnson v. Bell. 666 P.2d 308, 310 (Utah 1983). The effects of 
inquiry notice may be avoided only by actually inquiring with sufficient diligence to 
avoid the presumption of actual knowledge. Diversified Equities at 1137.9 
Where a document appears in a chain of title which gives indication of the 
existence of an easement, that document is "sufficient under the circumstances to put a 
9Higley cites Alaska case law on the issue of inquiry notice despite the fact that 
there is sufficient Utah case law to govern the issue, perhaps to take advantage of the 
language limiting inquiry notice to those facts "obvious from an inspection of the 
property." 
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reasonably prudent man on notice and to charge him with the duty to inquire further to 
ascertain what the facts were." Salt Lake. G. & W. Ry. Co. v. Allied Materials Co.. 
291 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah 1955) (noting that "[w]hen a person has sufficient information 
to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it"). The existence of physical 
improvements on the land may also give sufficient notice to create a duty to inquire. 
Id. at 886. Whether a party has sufficient notice to require further inquiry is essentially 
a question of fact. Diversified Equities at 1136. 
Despite his life-long experience in agriculture in the Blue Lakes area and his 
associated understanding of the importance of water, Higley claims he had no idea that 
Johnson owned and operated Blue Lakes. He also claims that he did not speak to 
property owners about ownership or the use of ditches crossing their lands or about use 
of the dikes at Blue Lakes. Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 504. He did admit at trial that 
he checked the State Engineer's records and was aware of the 1950 adjudication. But, 
he says I did not investigate any of the water issues involved nor examine the 1950 
decree. Appellant's Brief p. 8; R. 509, 787. Though he lived and worked in the area 
all his life, at trial Higley disingenuously disclaimed any knowledge, prior to his 
acquisition of his property, of Johnson's interest in Blue Lakes. 
By contrast, other life-long residents in the area were fully aware of Johnson's 
interest so much so that Blue Lakes became known as the "Wrathall/Johnson 
Reservoir." E.g., trial testimony of George C. "Cory" Brown, R. 448-451. 
Q. Cory, how long have you resided in the Tooele/Grantsville 
area? 
A. All my life. 
Q. And how old are you, Cory? 
A. 37. 
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Q. How long have you known Russell and Peter Johnson? 
A. Pretty much all my life. 
Q. How long have you been familiar with the Wrathall/Johnson 
reservoir? 
A. All my life. 
Q. Is that how the reservoir is referred to or named by those in the 
community? 
A. The local people in that little area call it the Johnson/Wrathall. 
Most people in Grantsville call it the Blue Lakes. 
Q. Now, do you live in Grantsville, Cory? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Do you have knowledge about whether Blue Lakes reservoir 
has been used by the Johnsons? 
A. It's been used as long as I can remember. 
[Objection entered for foundation. On establishing foundation and 
re-asking the questions, the answer was the same. 
R. 449, 450. It is not difficult to determine why the trial court believed Higley's 
testimony lacked credibility. 
Higley was aware of facts and circumstances which were sufficient to place him 
on notice that Johnson claimed an interest in the Blue Lakes reservoirs. Not only did 
he not conduct a reasonably diligent inquiry to determine what interests might exist as 
to the reservoirs and the Easement, he conducted no inquiry. Because the Easement 
was of record and appeared on Higley's title report and because everyone knew of 
Johnson's use of the Easement, the trial court disbelieved Higley and entered a finding 
that Higley had actual notice of the Easement. He is unable, therefore, to avail himself 
of bona fide purchaser status to avoid enforcement of the easement against him. 
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m . AT NO TIME DID JOHNSON OR HIS FATHER ABANDON THE 
EASEMENT. 
Though not expressly argued, Higley's characterization of the facts implies that 
the Easement was terminated by abandonment due to periods of alleged non-use.10 
Proof of abandonment requires "clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership 
and right of use and an intentional abandonment..." Western Gateway Storage Co. 
v. Treseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah 1977). See also Faulconer v. Williams. 936 
P.2d 999, 1002 (Or. App. 1997) ("the party seeking to extinguish the easement must 
show 'either [a] verbal expression of an intent to abandon or conduct inconsistent with 
an intention to make further use,'" (citation omitted)). It is well established law that 
non-use of an easement does not establish abandonment. Faulconer at 1002; Mueller v. 
Hoblvn. 887 P.2d 500, 505-506 (Wyo. 1994) ("Abandonment requires more than 
simple non-use of an easement, no matter how long the period of non-use."); Pickens 
v. Kemper. 847 P.2d 648, 651 (Colo. App. 1993) ("mere non-use of an easement (or a 
portion thereof) acquired by express grant, however long continued, does not work an 
abandonment or relinquishment of it. ").u In an extreme case of non-use of a reservoir 
easement, the Montana Supreme Court found no abandonment. 
Since the reservoir right of way in question can safely be 
characterized as an easement, we turn to the question of 
whether the lower court erred when it determined that said 
10Contradicting his claim that the Easement was abandoned, he claims his 
brother, Rulon Higley, owns the Easement. 
nSee also Kelouch v. Kramer. 813 P.2d 876, 878 (Idaho 1991); Citv of 
Edmonds v. Williams. 774 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Wash. App. 1989); Williams 
Telecommunications Co. v. Gragg. 750 P.2d 398, 400 (Kan. 1988); Restatement of 
Property § 504 comment d. 
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right of way had been abandoned. The rule in Montana is 
that in order to constitute an abandonment an intent to 
abandon is necessary. Certainly, Waters never 
communicated by word an intent to abandon the reservoir 
right of way. Further, and contrary to the claim of 
Eggebrecht, mere non-use of an easement by grant, no 
matter how long continued, does not constitute 
abandonment. The mere fact that from 1938 to 1976 no 
dam was in place with which to back water onto the 
reservoir site does not constitute abandonment of the 
reservoir right of way. 
E. E. Eggebrecht. Inc. v. Waters. 704 P.2d 422, 425 (Mont. 1985) (citations omitted). 
Higley presented no evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, of an 
intention by Johnson or his father to abandon the Easement. 
IV. IF THE ORIGINALLY GRANTED EASEMENT IS NOT VALID, OR IF 
WRATHALL HAD NO RIGHT TO ASSIGN AN INTEREST TO MAX 
JOHNSON, A PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT WAS ESTABLISHED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
In order to attribute any substance to Higley's argument that the facts do not 
support a conclusion that a prescriptive easement was established, it is necessary to 
accept his view of the world as set forth in his facts. Higley fails, however, to marshal 
the evidence and demonstrate that the trial court's factual findings on the issue of 
prescription are not supported. Again, this Court should defer to those findings and 
rely on them in its analysis of the application of the law to those facts. 
To establish an easement by prescription, Johnson must only show that his and 
his father's use of the land was open, continuous and adverse under a claim of right for 
a 20-year period. Valcarce at 24. See Crane v. Crane at 1067 (permitting tacking of a 
previous owner's interest to that of the owner claiming easement by prescription). If 
Johnson can show that his and his father's use has been open and notorious under a 
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claim of right for twenty years, the adverse element is presumed as a matter of law. 
Valcarce at 24. Higley's burden, which he completely failed to meet, is to demonstrate 
that the original use of the property was permissive. Valcarce at 24. 
In reviewing the trial court's findings that each element of a prescriptive 
easement exists, this Court accords the trial court "a broad measure of discretion when 
applying the correct legal standard to a given set of facts" and will overturn the 
determination "only if [it] find[s] that the trial judge's decision exceeded the broad 
discretion granted." Valcarce at 24. 
A. MAX JOHNSON'S ORIGINAL USE OF THE PROPERTY WAS 
NOT PERMISSIVE, MAKING THE USE OF THE EASEMENT 
ADVERSE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
On the one hand, Higley argues that Max Johnson had no legal right to the 
Easement, and therefore no right to store water on Brown and Anderson land. Higley 
men makes the argument, without factual support, that the original use of the property 
was permissive rather than adverse to the interest of Brown and Anderson. There are 
several fundamental flaws with his arguments. Higley argues that (1) Brown and 
Anderson "permitted" me use of their property for storage of water. Where are 
Higley's facts? 
Higley asserts the issue of permissive use is essentially a grant of license. 
Appellant's Brief p. 35, citing Green v. Stansfield. 886 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah App. 
1994). The significant features of a license are mat (1) it is created by mutual consent 
of the parties and (2) it is revocable at me will of the licensor. Burby, Handbook of the 
Law of Real Property. § 38 at 94 (1965). See also Sammons v. American Auto Ass'n. 
912 P.2d 1103, 1105 (Wyo. 1996) (license is a privilege revocable at will); Waneen v. 
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Kecskes, 845 P.2d 721, 725 (Mont. 1993); Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards Co.. 826 
P.2d 1328, 1333 (Idaho App. 1990) (license may be revoked by successor in interest to 
original licensor). 
Merely because Brown and Anderson did not challenge Max Johnson's use of 
the easement does not lead to the conclusion that they gave Max a license. There is no 
evidence that they reached a mutual agreement with Max Johnson to permit his use of 
the easement. To hold that not challenging an occupation or use amounts to permission 
would emasculate the prescriptive easement doctrine. Either WrathalTs assignment of 
an interest in the Easement to Max Johnson was valid, or Max Johnson had no legal 
right to store water on the Brown and Anderson land and his use was adverse. 
B. JOHNSON'S AND HIS FATHER'S USE OF BLUE LAKES HAVE 
BEEN OPEN AND CONTINUOUS UNDER CLAIM OF RIGHT. 
The crux of Higley's argument on this point is that there were interruptions in 
the use of part or all of the Easement at various times.12 However, '[a] use need not be 
'regular' or 'constant' in order to be continuous.' All that is necessary is that the use 
be as often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the claimant." Crane 
at 1064. Continuous use is established where the claimant uses the property as would 
another given the nature and location of the property. Lee v. Lozier. 945 P.2d 214, 
219 (Wash. App. 1997) (citations omitted). For example, use of a beach house only 
during summer months does not affect the continuous nature of the use. Id. (citation 
omitted). See also Malonev v. Wrevford. 804 P.2d 412, 415 (N.M. App. 1990) 
12Although not clearly articulated, Higley appears to be arguing that non-use of 
part of the Easement for any reason and for any length of time amounts to non-use of 
the entire easement. He provides no authority to support this position. 
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(variation in use from weekly to once every three months as needed by the user satisfies 
continuity requirement).13 
Johnson's father began his adverse use of the Blue Lakes reservoirs at least as 
early as the end of the 1950 litigation. Johnson testified that he had helped his father 
operate the ranch since the time he was eight years old (approximately 1960) and had 
spent his entire life around the property known as the Johnson ranch. R. 14.14 He 
testified that for as long as he could remember, Johnson and his father exclusively used 
the water from Blue Lakes. R. 27. 
Johnson's use of Blue Lakes has been continuous for over 40 years. True, the 
amount of water held in storage has varied over the years due to changes in water 
conditions-varying climatic conditions, construction of a city reservoir near 
Grantsville, construction of sewer ponds and increases in effluent discharge. R. 28-30. 
Johnson also testified that some of his father's original water right had lapsed but that 
Johnson continued to use the water without state-approved water rights. R. 30. When 
Johnson learned that he needed a state-approved water right, he applied for one and it 
was granted. 
Moreover, changes in the level of use depending on climatic and varying water 
conditions do not alter the continuity of the use. That, for many years, the use was 
13The 20-year prescriptive period is satisfied by adding or "tacking" Johnson's 
use with that of his father. Crane at 1067. See also Wood v. Brown. Inc.. 702 P.2d 
777, 779-80 (Idaho 1985) (adverse use properly tacked with adverse use by 
predecessors where privity exists between the users). 
14Johnson was bora in 1952, R. 14. He would have been eight years old in 
1960. 
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primarily during wet periods in the spring merely reflects the nature of irrigation in 
Utah. Johnson's use of Blue Lakes according to his needs and the nature of the use, 
including the availability of water by cycles or otherwise, constitutes a continuous use 
as a matter of law. Crane at 1064. 
George C. "Cory" Brown testified that Johnson used Blue Lakes water to supply 
his irrigation ditches for a 30-year period. R. 450. Asked whether Johnson's use had 
been continuous for the 30-year period, Brown testified that it had been "Mostly 
continuous, except for a couple of dry years." R. 451. On cross-examination, he 
testified that the use of the ditch leading from Blue Lakes was not continuous, "but in 
the spring and wet parts of the year, yes." R. 458, 459. Brown also testified that 
when he was little he saw Johnson's father use the Blue Lakes reservoir. R. 451. 
Higley's cousin, Sherman Higley, was 50 years old at the time of trial, had lived 
in Grantsville all his life and had known Johnson and Higley all his life. R. 592. 
Sherman Higley testified that he was familiar with the ditches leading from the Blue 
Lake reservoir to the Johnson property and was familiar with Johnson's use of Blue 
Lakes. R. 599, 600. He also testified that Johnson had been using the Blue Lakes 
reservoirs for as long as he could remember. R. 600.15 
15Sherman Higley also testified, without objection, about the veracities of 
Johnson and Higley: 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to Russell and Peter Johnson's honesty or 
integrity? 
A. Well, my opinion, they've always been honest to me. 
Q. And what about the defendant, Arthur Higley? 
A. Well, I've got a few opinions on that but I'd rather not say it. 
R. 600. 
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Higley either cites to his own testimony or colors the testimony of others to 
demonstrate why the evidence is inadequate to support the court's finding. Conflicting 
testimony, or that different inferences can be drawn from the testimony, does not make 
the trial court's findings wrong. 
The evidence also supports the trial court's finding that Johnson's use of the 
Easement was open. The open (and notorious)16 requirement is satisfied "if the 
landowner has actual knowledge of the use or if the circumstances are such that he may 
be charged with knowledge." Burby, supra, § 31 at 80. See also Jensen v. Gerrard. 
39 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Utah 1935) (requiring reasonable diligence on part of landowner); 
Mildenberger v. Galbraith. 815 P.2d 130, 134-35 (Mont. 1991) (the use must give the 
servient property owner actual knowledge or be "of such a character as to raise a 
presumption of notice."); Kaupp v. City of Hailev. 715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Idaho App. 
1986) (use "must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse 
use to a servient landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision over his 
premises.") 
It is hard to imagine how the storage of water in a reservoir could not be open 
and notorious. Johnson's and his father's use and maintenance of the Blue Lakes 
reservoirs was so continuous and open that life-long residents in the area nicknamed the 
reservoir after them. One can only wonder why Higley, who has spent his entire life 
16Some Utah cases, e.g., Green use the phrase "open and notorious" in place of 
the "open" requirement identified in Valcarce. Bodi terms boil down to the same 
factual requirements. 
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either living or working in the area and testified to significant familiarity with Blue 
Lakes and its dikes, lacks knowledge of the use. 
Johnson and his father used Blue Lakes under a claim of right. Johnson's claim 
of right derives from his inheritance of his father's interest in the Easement. His claim 
is also evidenced by his actions in 1986 when he devoted time and money in making 
repairs to the dikes to comply with the State Engineer's dam safety regulations. 
Johnson's claim of right is based in the original assignment by Wrathall and the 1950 
adjudication, and confirmed by his actions over a long period of time. 
The evidence supports the trial court's findings on all of the requirements for 
establishing a prescriptive easement. Higley has also failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court exceeded its broad discretion in applying the law to its factual findings. Valcarce 
at 24. This Court should, therefore, affirm the trial court's conclusion that a 
prescriptive easement was established in favor of Johnson. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT HIGLEY MAY NOT 
STORE WATER IN BLUE LAKES OR OTHERWISE INTERFERE WITH 
JOHNSON'S USE OF THE EASEMENT. 
There are at least two weaknesses with Higley's argument that he should be 
permitted to store water in the Blue Lakes reservoirs. First, and most importantiy, 
Higley does not have any right, tide or interest in the dam, dikes and related facilities. 
He has never spent a dime helping Johnson maintain these facilities. Max Johnson paid 
for the Easement and paid to construct the improvements on the ground necessary to 
store water. Joint use of Johnson's Easement and improvements would plainly require 
mutual consent. 
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The law which Higley relies upon deals with rights of access, i.e., the extent to 
which the servient property owner may place fences or gates on his property without 
interfering with access to and use of the easement. Other cases deal with concurrent 
uses of the land affected by the easement. E.g., Weggeland v. Ujifusa. 384 P.2d 590, 
591 (Utah 1963) (holding that landowner could use the right of way to the extent it did 
not interfere with access by the easement holder). The law as identified by Higley is 
inapplicable to a water storage reservoir or any other water conveyance device for that 
matter. Higley cites no cases that give a servient estate owner the unilateral right to use 
the dominant estate owner's improvements. 
This Blue Lakes facility is comprised of dikes, outlet works, a clay-lined bottom, 
and related features, all of which were expensive to build and to maintain. Johnson 
owns this facility and has the right to say how it is used and by whom. Absent his 
consent, Higley has no right to store water in Blue Lakes. Doing so would interfere 
with Johnson's property rights and limit his own ability to store. 
The second problem with Higley's position is that the grantors of the Easement 
did not reserve a right in the Blue Lakes reservoirs. The Easement grant expressly 
gives an "unconditional easement and use of so much of said above described land as 
will be covered and occupied by the storage of water therein and thereon . . . " The 
Easement is expressly not conditional upon any concurrent use by the servient property 
owner. 
Even if the Easement was created by prescription, Higley still has no basis for 
claiming an interest in the reservoirs. "The extent of a prescriptive easement is 
measured and limited by the historic use of the dominant estate owner during the 
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prescriptive period." Kunzler v. O'Dell. 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993) (citing 
McBride v. McBride. 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978)). With the exception of the use 
by Paul Wratiiall in the early days of the Easement, it has been used and maintained 
exclusively by Johnson and his father during the prescriptive period. Over the 
prescriptive period, the servient property owners prior to Higley have never asserted a 
right to use the reservoirs nor attempted to do so. 
In otiier words, the "purpose and character" of the Easement expressly and by 
historic use contemplate exclusive use by the grantee and his assigns. They do not 
contemplate a contemporaneous, similar use by the servient property owner. This 
litigation illustrates the problem with Higley's argument of an inherent right of joint 
use. Higley released Johnson's water so that he could men fill the reservoir with his 
own. He has clearly demonstrated that his joint use will create interference to 
Johnson's rights. 
The trial court properly concluded that Higley's use of the reservoirs would 
impermissibly interfere with Johnson's Easement. 
VI. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED HIGLEY'S MOTION TO 
JOIN INDISPENSABLE PARTIES. 
Before an analysis of Rule 19, Utah R. Civ. P. is possible, it is necessary to 
review the nature of Johnson's claims against Higley. This action involved two types 
of claims: (1) damage claims arising from Higley's interference with the Easement, and 
(2) claims for flood damages based upon negligent and intentional acts by Higley. 
Nobody other man Higley has challenged Johnson's exclusive right to use the 
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Easement.1 R. 43. The only other party affected by the Blue Lakes reservoirs is 
Grantsville City. The City asserts no claim in the Easement and is completely satisfied 
with Johnson's use of the property. 
Higley's argument that Johnson's action affects potential interests of others is 
disingenuous. He misconstrues the complaint and is merely attempting to overly 
complicate the case and frustrate Johnson's hopes of recovery. Johnson's claims 
against Higley were based upon Higley's ownership of the servient estate. Only Higley 
claims that Johnson had no easement rights to the Blue Lakes reservoirs. This action 
was against Higley to enjoin further interference. It is not an action to foreclose the 
rights of non-parties. 
The flooding claims are likewise based solely upon the actions or inactions of 
Higley and do not affect rights or liabilities of other parties. Johnson claimed that 
Higley intentionally drained Blue Lakes and intentionally or negligently flooded his 
lands in retaliation for Johnson protesting Higley's application for storage rights in Blue 
Lakes. R. 77. The flood damage claims are based upon Higley's unlawful practice of 
diverting water for irrigation use during the winter when the State Engineer has, on 
several occasions, ordered Higley not to do so. A second flooding event and claim 
17Higley's brother Rulon, upon prompting by Higley's attorneys, testified at trial 
that he wants to claim the Easement. He has never before used the reservoir. He has 
never contributed to any of the expenses to maintain the dikes. Rulon did not move to 
intervene in this action. His testimony at trial was the first indication to Johnson that 
he claimed any interest. R. 681-682; R. 206-210. The trial court subsequendy found 
Higley was using Rulon, in essence, to claim a right to store water in Blue Lakes. 
Rulon's claim was found to be unsupported by credible evidence. R. 533, Finding 
No. 15. 
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arose out of Higley undersizing an irrigation pipe18 and then refusing to take corrective 
action to mitigate the flooding after being notified by Johnson. R. 76. 
There is no dispute that other parties own interests in certain wells and ditches. 
However, the claims against Higley are based only upon his actions and are not based 
upon ownership of the well or other facilities. 
Higley correctly states the two-part analysis involved under Rule 19, 
Utah R. Civ. P. The first step, determining whether a party is necessary, involves an 
analysis of whether the relief sought can be completely obtained from the defendants 
without affecting the rights of others. E.g., Werner-Jacobsen v. Bednarik. 946 P.2d 
744, 746-47 (Utah App. 1997). 
The first step is satisfied because Johnson sought no damages against any other 
parties. R. 76. Johnson sought no remedy based on who owned the wells, pipes or 
ditches. He pursued no court order affecting the interests of others. He sought only 
damages from Higley for his own actions or inactions. See Ludlow v. Salt Lake 
County Bd of Adjustment. 893 P.2d 1101, 1104 (Utah App. 1995) (absence of 
indispensable parties may be overcome by asserting only claims for relief that do not 
require the presence of other parties, citations omitted). 
18Higley's claim that liability should be shared because he used a small calculator 
(but Steven St. Clair used a "computer") is not consistent with the court's findings. 
During direct examination, Higley flat out admitted that he sized the pipe. R. 563, 
576. Higley's computer program explanation to direct liability away from himself was 
elicited by his counsel on cross-examination. Simply put, the court found that 
testimony incredible. 
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The facts related to Johnson's claims support the trial court's conclusions that 
other parties were not necessary and joinder was not required.19 If, as argued by 
Higley, the trial court's identification of facts and reasoning is insufficient, that failure 
is harmless error and the trial court's ruling can be affirmed. Werner-Jacobsen at 747. 
Higley has presented no facts material to Johnson's specific claims which supports a 
contrary finding. Nor has he demonstrated any inadequacy of the facts supporting the 
trial court's ruling. Because there is evidence, material to the specific claims asserted 
by Johnson, which support the trial court's ruling, there is no abuse of discretion and 
this Court should affirm that decision. 
VH. HIGLEY HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT HE WAS LIABLE FOR THE 
FLOODING DAMAGES OR TO DEMONSTRATE THE INADEQUACY 
OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Higley has failed to marshal all of the evidence on this issue and makes no 
attempt to demonstrate that the evidence supporting the trial court's ruling is 
insufficient. For example, he makes no reference to the testimony of Rulon Higley 
which evidences Higley's responsibility for the flooding and other injuries to Johnson. 
R. 679-701. Higley makes no reference to testimony from Russell Johnson stating that 
he clearly notified Higley of the flooding and requested action to no avail. He makes 
no reference to his own testimony where he admits receiving that notice and admits to 
taking no corrective action. R. 795-798. 
19It is also significant that the relief ordered by the trial court affects only 
Johnson and does not affect the rights or other interests of other parties. 
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Higley focuses on the issue of the sufficiency of the size of the pipe in 
challenging the court's ruling. Appellant's Brief pp. 48-49. He even claims, with no 
reference to the record, that the court "found the pipe sufficed to accept and carry the 
entire flow from the Higley wells." Id. This "finding" is expressly contrary to the 
court's findings of fact and lacks support anywhere in the record. 
Rulon testified that Higley was the one who handled water matters for the 
pipeline and well owners. R. 686-687. He testified that Higley was aware of flooding 
problems from the pipeline and failed to address them. R. 689-690. There were also 
other causes of the flooding. For example, Rulon testified that Higley was aware of 
and failed to remove a blockage on the Higley ditch which would have alleviated 
flooding from the pipeline. R. 690-691. John Mann from the State Engineer's Office 
testified that if the excess flow had been permitted to go into the ditch, the pipeline 
would not have caused the flooding. R. 149. This testimony, in addition to that given 
by Johnson, supports the trial court's findings on this issue. Because Higley has failed 
to properly marshal the evidence or demonstrate its insufficiency, this Court should 
accept and affirm the trial court's ruling. 
At the outset, Higley had at his disposal the legal means to assure that he was 
not assessed with more liability than his conduct warranted. He could have initiated a 
third-party action under Rule 14, Utah R. Civ. P. against the parties he believes should 
share in his liability. He did not do so. He could have sought an allocation of the 
liability of others pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38(4).20 He did not do so. By 
20The allocation provisions of § 78-27-38(4) are permissive for the court unless 
the party seeking allocation makes a request of the court. Utah Code Ann. 
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his failure to seek these protections, Higley has waived a right to now complain that the 
$8,650 judgment should be apportioned. 
Vm. HIGLEY ALSO FAILS TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF HIS CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 
THAT HE INTERFERED WITH JOHNSON'S EASEMENT. 
Higley again focuses on his own favorable testimony to the exclusion of 
everything else on the issue of whether he instructed Rulon to release water from Blue 
Lakes. In his brief, Higley acknowledges that Higley well water had been stored in 
Blue Lakes. Appellant's Brief p. 49. Rulon testified that he and Higley decided to 
store Higley well water in the Blue Lakes Easement. R. 682-683. Rulon also testified 
that Arthur instructed an unidentified backhoe operator to destroy Johnson's ditch and 
construct a new ditch into Blue Lakes for the purpose of draining Johnson's water from 
the reservoir and deliver it to Higley's land. R. 699. See also testimony of Russell 
Johnson at R. 77-79. The end result was that Johnson's farm went dry during the late 
summer months when water was critical. 
This testimony, along with other evidence which Higley fails to marshal, 
supports the trial court's finding that Higley interfered with Johnson's Easement. 
Therefore, this Court should adopt and affirm the trial court's factual findings and 
ruling. 
§ 78-27-38(4)(a). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should adopt and affirm the trial court's findings. The trial court 
properly applied the findings to the legal principles involved in this case. This Court 
should affirm the judgment of the trial court in all respects. 
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EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage of this policy and the Company will not pay loss or damage, 
costs, attorneys' fees or expenses which arise by reason of: 
1. (a) Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but not limited to building and zoning laws, ordinances, or 
regulations) restricting, regulating, prohibiting or relating to (i) the occupancy, use, or enjoyment of the land; (ii) the 
character, dimensions or location of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land; (Hi) a separation in 
ownership or a change \n the dimensions or area of the land or any parcel of which the land is or was a part; or (iv) 
environmental protection, or the effect of any violation of these laws, ordinances or governmental regulations, ex-
cept to the extent that a notice of the enforcement thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or encumbrance resulting 
from a violation or alleged violation affecting the land has been recorded in the public records at Date of Policy. 
(b) Any governmental police power not excluded by (a) above, except to the extent that a notice of the 
exercise thereof or a notice of a defect, lien or encumbrance resulting from a violation or alleged violation affecting 
the land has been recorded in the public records at Date of Policy. 
2. Rights of eminent domain unless notice of the exercise thereof has been recorded in the public records at Date of 
Policy, but not excluding from coverage any taking which has occurred prior to Date of Policy which would be binding 
on the rights of a purchaser for value without knowledge. 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters: 
(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured claimant; 
(b) not known to the Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but known to the 
insured claimant and not disclosed in writing to the Company by the insured claimant prior to the date the insured 
claimant became an insured under this policy; 
(c) resulting in no loss or damage to the insured claimant; 
(d) attaching or created subsequent to Date of Policy; or 
(e) resulting in loss or damage which would not have been sustained if the insured claimant had paid value for the 
estate or inlsrest insured by this policy. 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
DEFINITION OF TERMS. 
The following terms when used in this policy mean: 
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. and. subject to any rights or defenses 
the Company would have had against the named insured, those who succeed to the interest 
of the named insured by operation of law as distinguished from purchase including, but not 
limited to. heirs, distributees, devisees, survivors, persona* representatives, next of kin. or 
corporate or fiduciary successors. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage 
(c) "knowledge" or "known": actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge or notice 
which may be imputed to an insured by reason of the public records as defined in this policy 
or any other records which impart constructive notice of matters affecting the land. 
(d> "land": the land described or referred to in Schedule A. and improvements affixed 
thereto which by law constitute real property. The term "land" does not include any property 
beyond the lines of the area described or referred to in Schedule A. nor any right, title, 
interest, estate or easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, ways or 
waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent to which a right of access to 
and from the land is insured by this policy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument. 
(f) "public records"; records established under state statutes at Date of Policy for the 
purpose of imparting constructive notice of matters relating to real property to purchasers 
for value and without knowledge. With respect to Section l(a)(iv) of the Exclusions From 
Coverage, "public records" shall also include environmental protection tiens filed in the 
records of the clerk ol the United States district court tor the district in which the land is 
located. 
(g) "unmarketability of the title": an alleged or apparent matter affecting the title to the 
land, not excluded or excepted from coverage, which would entitle a purchaser of the estate 
or interest described in Schedule A to be released from the obligation to purchase by virtue 
ol a contractual condition requiring the delivery of marketable title. 
2. CONTINUATION OF INSURANCE AFTER CONVEYANCE OF TITLE. 
The coverage ol this policy shall continue m force as of Oate of Policy in favor of an 
insured only so long as the insured retains an estate or interest in the land, or holds an 
indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from the 
insured, or only so long as the insured shall have liability by reason of covenants of warranty 
made by the insured in any transfer or conveyance ol the estate or interest. This policy shall 
not continue in force in lavor ol any purchaser from the insured of either («) an estate or 
interest in the land, or (ii) an indebtedness secured by a purchase money mortgage given to 
the insured. 
3. NOTICE OF CLAIM TO BE GIVEN BY INSURED CLAIMANT. 
The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing (i) in case of any litigation as 
set forth in Section 4(a) below, (ii) in case knowledge shall come to an insured hereunder of 
a^» claim of title or interest which is adverse to the title to the estate or interest, as insured, 
^ich might cause loss or damage (or which the Company may be liable by virtue of this 
, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable. If 
»,._..ipt notice shall not be given to the Company, then as to the insured all liability of the 
Company shall terminate with regard to the matter or matters for which prompt notice is 
required; provided, however, that failure to notify the Company shall in no case prejudice the 
rights of any insured under this policy unless the Company shall be prejudiced by the failure 
and then only to the extent of the prejudice. 
4. DEFENSE AND PROSECUTION OF ACTIONS; DUTY OF INSURED CLAIMANT TO 
COOPERATE. 
(a) Upon written request by the insured and subject to the options contained in Section 
6 of these Conditions and Stipulations, the Company, at its own cost and without 
unreasonable delay, shall provide lor the defense of an insured in litigation in which any 
third party asserts a claim adverse to the title or interest as insured, but only as to those 
stated causes of action alleging a defect, lien or encumbrance or other matter insured 
against by this policy. The Company shall have the right to select counsel of its choice 
(subject to the right ol the insured to object for reasonable cause) to represent the insured 
as to those stated causes of action and snail not be liable lor and will not pay the fees of any 
other counsel. The Company will not pay any fees, costs or expenses incurred by the insured 
in the defense of those causes of action which allege matters not insured against by this 
policy. 
(0) The Company shall have the right, at its own cost, to institute and prosecute any 
action or proceeding or to do any other act which in its opinion may be necessary or 
desirable to establish the utle to the estate or interest, as insured, or to prevent or reduce 
loss or damage to the insured. The Company may lake any appropriate action under the 
terms ol this policy, whether or not it shall be liable hereunder and shall not thereby 
concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. If the Company shali exercise its 
rights under this paragraph, it shall do so diligently. 
(c) Whenever the Company shall have brought an action or interposed a defense as 
required or permitted by the provisions of this policy, the Company may pursue any 
litigation to final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves 
the right, in its sole discretion, to appeal from any adverse judgment or order. 
(d) in all cases where this policy permits or requires the Company to prosecute or 
provide for the defense ol any action or proceeding, the insured shall secure to the Company 
the rrght to so prosecute or provide defense in the action or proceeding, and all appeals 
therein, and permit the Company to use. at its option, the name of the insured for this 
purpose. Whenever requested by the Company, the insured, at the Company's expense, 
shall give the Company all reasonable aid (i) in any action or proceeding, securing evidence, 
obtaining witnesses, prosecuting or defending the action or proceeding, or effecting 
settlement, and (ii) in any other lawful act which in the opinion of the Company may be 
necessary or desirable to establish the title to the estate or interest as insured. If Ihe 
Company is prejudiced by the failure of the insured to furnish the required cooperation, the 
Company's obligations to the insured under the policy shall terminate, including any liability 
or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, with regard to the matter or 
matters requiring such cooperation. 
5. PROOF OF LOSS OR DAMAGE. 
In addition to and after the notices required under Section 3 of these Conditions and 
Stipulations have been provided the Company, a proof of loss or damage signed and sworn 
to by the insured claimant shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days after the 
insured claimant shall ascertain the (acts giving rise to the loss or damage. The proof of loss 
or damage shall describe the delect in, or lien or encumbrance on the title, or other matter 
insured against by this policy which constitutes the basis of loss or damage and shall state, 
to Ihe extent possible, the basis of calculating the amount of the loss or damage. If the 
Company is prejudiced by the failure ofjhe insured claimant to provide the required proof of 
loss or damage, the Company's obligations to the insured under the policy shall terminate, 
including any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, with 
regard to the matter or matters requiring suph proof .of loss or damage. 
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SCHEDULE A 
Date of Policy: March 15, 1990 at 3:31 p.m. 
FILE NO. 05-119-89 EXPOSURE AMOUNT $225. 000. 00 
POLICY NO. 30-2281 POLICY PREMIUM $967.50 
1. Name of Insured: 
ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY and SUSAN M. HIGLEY 
2. The estate or interest in the land described herein and 
which is covered by this policy is: 
FEE SIMPLE 
3* The estate or interest refe^r^ed to herein is at Date of 
Policy vested in: 
II 
ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY and SUSAN M. HIGLEY, husband and wife, 
as joint tenants with full right to survivorship 
4. The land referred to in this policy is described as follows: 
Located in TOOELE County, State of Utah: 
PARCEL 1: 
The East 1/2 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 8, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West. 
PARCEL 2: 
The Southwest 1/4 of Section 9, Township 2 South, Range 5 
West, LESS Railroad Right of Way. 
PARCEL 3: 
The West 1/2 of Section 16, Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
LESS Railroad Right of Way. 
PARCEL 4: 
The Northwest 1/4 of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 16, 
Township 2 South, Range 5 West, LESS Railroad Right of Way. 
PARCEL 5: 
The North 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 17, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West. 
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PARCEL S : 
The Southwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 20, 
Township 2 South, Range 5 West, LESS any portion lying in 
County Roads. 
PARCEL 7: 
The West 1/2 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 20, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West, LESS any portion lying in County Roads. 
PARCEL 8: 
The East 1/2 of the Southwest 1/4 of Section 20, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West, LESS any portion lying in County Roads. 
PARCEL 9: 
The West 2/3 of the West 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4 of Section 
20, Township 2 South, Range 5 West. {{ 
PARCEL 10: 
The East 1/2 of the Southeast 1/4 of Section 20, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West. 
PARCEL lis 
The West 1/2 of Section 21, Township 2 South, Range 5 West. 
PARCEL 12: 
The Eastern 1023 feet of the Northeast 1/4 of the Northwest 
1/4 of Section 28, Township 2 South, Range 5 West. 
PARCEL 13: 
BEGINNING at the Northwest cor^n&yr of Section 28, Township 2 
South, Range 5 West, thence East along Section line 1717.7 
feet to the Grantsville City Line? thence South along said 
City line 1320 feet to the South line of the Northeast 1/4 
of the Northwest 1/45 thence West 1717.7 feet to Section 
line? thence North along Section line 1320 feet, to the 
point of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL 14: 
The Northeast 1/4 of Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 5 
West. 
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PARCEL 15: 
The East 1/2 of the Northeast 1/4 of the Northwest 1/4 of 
Section 29, Township 2 South, Range 5 West. 
This Policy Valid Only If Schedule B Is Attached. 
FORM T-33GH1-81) 
American Land Title Association Owner's Policy, Form B 1970 
(Amended 10-17-70) 
Schedule A 
mn 
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SCHEDULE B 
FILE NO. 05 -119-69 
POLICY NO. 30-gaai 
This policy does not 
the following: 
insure against loss or damage by reason of 
1. Rights or claims of persons in possession, or claiming to be 
in possession, easements, liens or encumbrances including 
material or labor liens, which are not shown by the public 
records* reservations in the patents or state grants, or in 
acts authorizing the issuance thereof? mineral rights, water 
rights, claims or title to mineral or water. 
2. Questions of location, boundary and areas? overlaps and 
encroachments by improvements belonging to these or 
adjoining premises* all dependent upon actual survey for 
determination. 
11 
3. Assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the 
public records? taxes not yet payable? pending proceedings 
for vacating opening or changing streets or highways 
preceding entry of the final ordinance or order therefore. 
4. Taxes for the year 1990 now accruing as a lien, not yet due. 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid in the amount of $8. 19. 
Tax Serial No. 05-054-0-0015. 
(Affects Parcel 1) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid in the amount of $11.26. 
Tax Serial No. 05-053-0-0003. 
(Affects Parcel 2) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 05-057-0-0006. 
(Affects Parcel 3 and 4) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 05-056-0-0005. 
(Affects Parcel 5) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 05-061-0-0005. 
(Affects Parcel 6, 7 and 8) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 05-061-0-0007. 
(Affects Parcel 9) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 05-061-0-0003. 
(Affects Parcel 10) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 05-057-0-0008. 
(Affects Parcel 11) 
Tax Serial No. 05-075-0-0009 and 05-' 
included in Tax Serial No. 05-057-0-0008 
ir\ the amount of $23.65. 
in the amount of $5.33-
in the amount of $13.99. 
in the amount of $4.26. 
in the amount of $6.46. 
in the amount of $21.45. 
057-0-0010 are now 
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( A f f e c t s Parcel 11) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid in the amount 
Tax Serial No, 05-064-0-0086. 
(Affects Parcel 12) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid in the amount 
Tax Serial No. 01-041-0-0004. 
(Affects Parcel 13) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid in the amount of $4.43. 
Tax Serial No. ©1-041-0-0005. 
(Affects Parcel 13) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. ©1-042-0-0001. 
(Affects Parcel 14) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 01-042-0-0002. 
(Affects Parcel 14 and 15) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 01-042-0-0007. 
(Affects Parcel 14) 
Taxes for the year 1989 were paid 
Tax Serial No. 01-042-0-0008. 
(Affects Parcel 14) 
in the amount of $2.84. 
in the amount of $6.91. 
in the amount of $4.70. 
in the amount of $4.96. 
l! 
6. Said property is within the boundaries of Tooele Valley 
Mosquito Abatement District and Grantsvilie City, and is 
subject to any charges and assessments levied thereunder. 
7. Proceedings for municipal improvements, which, at the date 
hereof, 3L)TG shown by the official records of any such city, 
but have not resulted in the imposition of a lien upon, or 
establishment of an easement over, or adjudication upon, or 
of the right to a public use of said land or any part 
thereof. 
8. SUBJECT to the 5 year roll back provisions contained in the 
following Applications for Assessment and Taxation of 
Agricultural Land (Greenbelt Amendment): 
(a) recorded November 27, 1973, Entry No. 302899, Book 125, 
Page 567. 
(Affects Parcels 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14 and 15) 
(b) recorded December 19, 1974, Entry No. 307039, Book 131, 
Page 963. 
(Affects Parcel 11) 
(c) recorded October 21, 1981, Entry No. 348259, Book 197, 
Page 590. 
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( A f f e c t s P a r c e l 14) 
9- Easement, granting to INTERNATIONAL SMELTING AND REFINING 
COMPANY to operate a smelter without incurring liability as 
recited ir\ various documents of record, 
10. Easement, granting to MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, an 
easement over and across a portion of said property, 
recorded January 20, 1971 as Entry No. 292538 in Book 235, 
at Page 236. 
(Affects Parcel 11) 
11. Easement, granting to PAUL E. WRATHALL, an easement to 
building and maintain a water shortage reservoir on a 
portion of said property, recorded March 6, 1946 in Book 
"E", at page 610. 
(Affects Parcels 7, 8, 14 and 15) 
12. Easement, granting to AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY OF WYOMING, an easement over and across a portion of 
said property, recorded September 5, 1942 in Bof^ k "EM at 
page 318. 
(Affects Parcels 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11) 
13. Easement, granting to AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY OF WYOMING, an easement over and across a portion of 
said property, recorded August 17, 1942 in Book "E", page 
304. 
(Affects Parcels 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) 
14. Easement, granting to AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY OF WYOMING, ar\ easement over and across a portion of 
said property, recorded September 5, 1942 in Book "E", at 
page 319. 
(Affects Parcels 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10) 
15. SUBJECT to any and all roads, ditches, canals and railroad 
which may traverse said property. 
16. Easement, dated December 24, 1984, in favor of UTAH POWER 
AND LIGHT COMPANY, to construct, reconstruct, operate, 
maintain and repair over, under, and across the subject 
property. The subject property constitutes a portion of and 
lies within the legal description of said easement. 
Easement recorded February 15, 1985, as Entry No. 366062, in 
Book 226, at Page 699 of Official Records. 
(Affects Parcels 1, 3 and 5) 
17. A Grant of Easements dated July 18, 1988 and recorded 
October 11, 1988 as Entry No. 21600 in Book 278 at page 208-
m 
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211 of Official REcords, by and between CLEGS LIVESTOCK 
COMPANY and FEDERAL INTERMEDIATE CREDIT BANK OF OMAHA. 
18. A Resolution for HOSPITAL SPECIAL SERVICE DISTRIBUTION 
recorded in Book 87 at pages 20 of Official Records. 
19. A Resolution for FIRE PROTECTION SERVICE DISTRIBUTION 
recorded in BOok 87 at page 21 of Official Records. 
20. Subject to any outstanding oil and gas, mining and mineral 
rights, etc., together with the right of the proprietor of a 
vein or lode to extract his ore therefrom should the same be 
found to penetrate or intersect the premises, and the right 
of ingress and egress for the use of said rights. 
Countersigned by L^ 7 
Authorised Signatory 
Schedule B of this Policy consists of 2 Page(s) 
FORM T-33K1-81) 
American Land Title Association Owner's Policy, Form 1970 
(Amended 10-17-70) 
Schedule B 
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In addition, me insured claimant may reasogably be required 10 suDm.t 10 examination 
under oath by any authorised representative, of (he Company and shall produce for 
examination, inspection and copying, at such reasonable limes and places as may be 
designated by any authorized representative of the Company, all records, books, ledgers, 
checks, correspondence and memoranda, whether bearing a dale before or after Date of 
Policy, which reasonably pertain to the loss or damage. Further, if requested by any 
authorized representative of the Company, the insured claimant shall grant (ts permission, 
in writing, (or any authorized representative of the Company to examine, inspect and copy all 
records, books, ledgers, checks, correspondence and memoranda in the custody or control 
of a third party, which reasonably pertain to the loss or damage. All information designated 
confidential by the insured claimant provided lo the Company pursuant to this Section 
II not be disclosed to others unless, in the reasonable judgment of the Company, it is 
-cessary in the administration of the claim. Failure of the insured claimant to submit for 
examination under oath, produce other reasonably requested information or grant 
permission lo secure reasonably necessary information from third parties as required in this 
paragraph shall terminate any liability of the Company under this policy as to that claim. 
6. OPTIONS TO PAY OR OTHERWISE SETTLE CLAIMS; TERMINATION OF LIABILITY. 
In case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following additional 
options: 
(a) To Pay or Tender Payment of the Amount of Insurance. 
To pay or tender payment of the amount of insurance under this policy together 
with any costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by (he insured claimant, which were 
authorized by the Company, up to the time of payment or tender of payment and which the 
Company is obligated to pay. 
Upon the exercise by the Company of this option, all liability and obligations lo the 
insured under this policy, other than lo make the payment required, shall terminate, in-
cluding any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation, and the 
policy shall be surrendered to the Company for cancellation. 
(b) To Pay or Otherwise Settle With Parties Other than the Insured or With the Insured 
Claimant. 
(i) to pay or otherwise settle with other parties for or in the name of an insured 
claimant any claim insured against under (his policy, together with any costs, 
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant which were author-
ized by the Company up to the lime of payment and which the Company is obligated 
lo pay; or 
(ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss or damage pro-
vided for under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys fees and expenses 
incurred by the insured claimant which were authorized by the Company up to the 
time of payment and which the Company is obligated to pay. 
Upon the exercise by the Company of either of the options provided for in 
paragraphs b(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under this policy for the 
claimed loss or damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall terminate, in-
cluding any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute or continue any litigation. 
7. DETERMINATION, EXTENT OF LIABILITY AND COINSURANCE. 
This policy is a contract of indemnity against actual monetary loss or damage sustained 
or incurred by the insured claimant who has suffered loss or damage by reason of matters 
insured against by this policy and only to the extent herein described. 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall not exceed the least of: 
(i) the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A; or 
(ii) the difference between the value of the insured estate or interest as insured 
and the value of the insured estate or interest subject to the defect, lien or encum-
brance insured against by this policy. 
) In the event the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A at the Date of Policy is 
man 80 percent of the value of the insured estate or interest or the full consideration 
paid for the land, whichever is less, or if subsequent to the Oate of Policy an improvement is 
erected on the land which increases the value of the insured estate or interest by at least 20 
percent over the Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A, then this Policy is subject to the 
following: 
(i) where no subsequent improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the 
Company shall only pay the loss pro rata in the proportion that the amount of in 
surance at Date of Policy bears to the total value of the insured estate or interest at 
Date of Policy; or 
(ii) where a subsequent improvement has been made, as to any partial loss, the 
Company shall only pay Ihe IOSS pro rata in the proportion that 120 percent of the 
Amount of Insurance stated in Schedule A bears to the sum of the Amount of In-
surance stated in Schedule A and the amount expended for the improvement. 
The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to costs, attorneys' fees and expenses 
for which the Company is liable under this policy, and shall only apply to that portion of any 
loss which exceeds, in the aggregate. 10 percent of the Amount of insurance stated in 
Schedule A. 
(c) The Company wili pay only those costs, attorneys' fees and expenses incurred m 
accordance with Section 4 of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
8. APPORTIONMENT. 
If the land described in Schedule A consists of two or more parcels which are not used 
as a single site, and a loss is established affecting one or more of the parcels but not all. the 
loss shall be computed and settled on a pro rata basis as if the amount of insurance under 
this policy was divided pro rata as to the value on Date ol Policy ol each separate parcel to 
the whole, exclusive of any improvements made subsequent to Dale of Policy, unless a 
liability or value has otherwise been agreed upon as to each parcel by the Company and the 
insured at the time ol the issuance of this policy and shown by an express statement or by 
an endorsement attached to this policy. 
9. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY. 
(a) If Ihe Company establishes the title, or removes the alleged defect, lien or encum-
brance, or cures the lack of a right of access to or from ihe land, or cures the claim of 
unmarketability of title, all as insured, in a reasonably diligent manner by any method, in-
cluding litigation and the completion of any appeals Iherefrom, it shall have fully performed 
its obligations with respect to that matter and shall not be liable for any loss or damage 
caused thereby. 
(b) In the event of any litigation, including Iitigation by the Company or with Ihe Com-
pany's consent, the Company shall have no liability for loss or damage until there has been a 
final determination by a court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of ail appeals 
therefrom, adverse to the title as insured. 
The Company shall not be liable for loss or damage to any insured for liability volun-
% sumed by Ihe insured in settling any claim or suit without the prior written consent 
d. Jompany. 
'0. REDUCTION OF INSURANCE; REDUCTION OR TERMINATION OF LIABILITY. 
AH payments under this policy, excepf payments made for costs, attorneys' fees and 
expenses, shall reduce Ihe amount of Ihe insurance pro tanto. 
11. LIABILITY NONCUMULATIVE. 
II is expressly understood that the amount of insurance under this policy shall be 
reduced by any amount the Company may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage to 
which exception is taken in Schedule B or to which the insured has agreed, assumed br 
taken subject, or which is hereafter executed by an insured and which is a charge or lien on 
the eslate or interest described or referred to in Schedule A. and the amount so paid shall be 
deemed a payment under this policy to Ihe insured owner 
12. PAYMENT OF LOSS. 
(a) No payment shall be made without producing this policy for endorsement of the 
payment unless Ihe policy has been lost or destroyed, in which case proof of loss or destruc-
tion shall be furnished to the satisfaction of the Company. 
(b) When liability and the extent of loss or damage has been definitely fixed in accord-
ance with these Conditions and Stipulations, the loss or damage shall be payable within 30 
days thereafter. 
13. SUBROGATION UPON PAYMENT OR SETTLEMENT. 
(a) The Company's Right of Subrogation. 
Whenever the Company shall have settled and paid a claim under this policy, alt right of 
subrogation shall vest in the Company unaffected by any act of the insured claimant. 
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled lo all rights and remedies which 
the insured claimant would have had against any person or property in respect.to the claim 
had this policy not been issued. If requested by the Company, the insured claimant shall 
transfer to the Company all rights and remedies against any person or property necessary in 
order to perfect this right of subrogation. The insured claimant shall permit the Company to 
sue. compromise or settle in the name of the insured claimant and lo use the name of the in-
sured claimant in any transaction or litigation involving these rights or remedies. 
If a payment on account of a claim does not fully cover the loss of the insured claimant; 
the Company shall be subrogated to these rights and remedies in the proportion which the 
Company's payment bears to the whole amount of (he loss. 
If loss should result from any act of the insured claimant, as stated above, that act shall 
not void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required to pay only that part of 
any losses insured against by this policy which shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the 
Company by reason of the impairment by the insured claimant of the Company's right of 
subrogation. 
(b) The Company's Rights Against Non-Insured Obligors. 
The Company's right of subrogation against non-insured obligors shall exist and shall 
include, without limitation, the rights of the insured to indemnities, guaranties, other 
policies of insurance or bonds, notwithstanding any terms or conditions contained in those 
instruments which provide for subrogation rights by reason of this policy. 
14. ARBITRATION. . . 
Unless prohibited by applicable law, either the Gompanyor the insured may demand 
arbitration pursuant to the Title Insurance Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association. Arbitrable matters may include, but are not limited to. any controversy or claim 
between the Company and the insured arising out of or relating to this policy, any service of 
the Company in connection with its issuance or the breach of a policy provision or other 
obligation. All arbitrable matters when the Amount of Insurance is SI.000.000 or less shall be 
arbitrated at the option of either the Company or the insured. All arbitrable matters when Ihe 
Amount of Insurance is in excess of $1,000,000 shall be arbitrated only when agreed to by 
both the Company and the insured. Arbitration pursuant to this policy and under the Rules in 
effect on the date the demand for arbitration is made or. at the option of (he insured, the 
Rules in effect at Oate of Policy shall be binding upon the parties. The award may include at-
torneys' fees only if the laws of the stale in which the land is located permit a court to award 
attorneys' fees to a prevailing party. Judgment upon the award rendered by the Arbitrator(s) 
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof 
The law of the situs of the land shall apply to an arbitration under the Title Insurance 
Arbitration Rules. 
A copy of the Rules may be obtained from the Company upon request. 
15. LIABILITY LIMITEO TO THIS POLICY; POLICY ENTIRE CONTRACT. 
(a) This policy together with all endorsements, if any, attached hereto by the Com-
pany is the entire policy and contract between the insured and the Company. In interpreting 
any provision of this policy, this policy shall be construed as a whole. 
(b) Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negligence, and which 
arises out of the status of the iitie to the estate or interest covered hereby or by any action 
asserting such claim, shall be restricted to this policy. 
(c) No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made except by a writing 
endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by either the President, a Vice President, the 
Secretary, an Assistant Secretary, or validating officer or authorized signatory of the 
Company. 
16. SEVERABILITY. 
In the event any provision ol the policy is held invalid or unenforceable under 
applicable law. the policy shall be deemed not to include mat provision and all other provi-
sions shall remain in full force and effect. 
17. NOTICES. WHERE SENT. 
All notices required to be given the Company and any statement in writing required to 
be furnished the Company shall include the number of this policy and shall be addressed to 
the Company at: P.O. Box 369. Denver. CO 80201. 
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COLORADO 
P.O. Box 869 
Denver, Colorado 80201 
(303) 292-3055 
Colorado WATS: (800) 322-6746 
National WATS: (800) 525-6558 
MINNESOTA 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55426 
(612)938-3544 
Minnesota WATS: (800) 292-4104 
UTAH 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801)364-1818 
Collect Calls Accepted 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUSSELL JOHNSON and PETER 
JOHNSON, 
PlaintifFs/Counter-Defendants, 
V . 
ARTHUR STEPHEN HIGLEY and : 
SUSAN M. HIGLEY, : 
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs. : 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 970300044 
Judge John A. Rokich 
This case came before the Court for a five-day bench trial on September 10, 15, 
16, 29 and 30, 1997. Plaintiffs were represented by Marc Wangsgard of the firm 
Williams & Hunt, and defendants were represented by B. Kent Ludlow and John K. 
Mangum of the firm Nielsen & Senior. On September 24, 1997, the Court conducted a 
site inspection of the real property involved, together with counsel and the parties. The 
case was argued before the Court on October 17, 1997. The Court having considered 
the pleadings, testimony at trial, the exhibits admitted into evidence, the argument of 
0 0 0 , " * >&$ i
counsel, and otherwise for good cause appearing, now makes and enters the following 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs Russell and Peter Johnson are the sole owners of what is known as 
the Johnson Ranch, which includes land in Sections 17, 18 and 19 of Township 2 South, 
Range 5 West, SLB&M in Tooele County. Included in the Johnson Ranch are 192.5 
acres of irrigated land. The same 192.5 acres has been irrigated since 1950 with water 
from sources including Fishing Creek, storage water from Blue Lakes Reservoir, and 
water discharged from the Grantsville City sewer lagoons. 
2. Plaintiffs are the sole owners of the Johnson Ranch, the water rights used in 
connection with the ranch, the right to store water in Blue Lakes Reservoir, the ditch 
works connecting the reservoir to plaintiffs' lands, and all other appurtenant facilities. 
3. Defendants Arthur Stephen Higley and Susan M. Higley are husband and 
wife and own certain real property located in Tooele County and adjacent to the Johnson 
Ranch. 
4. Blue Lakes Reservoir, at full capacity, inundates land owned by defendants 
and also land owned by Grantsville City. Grantsville City has never disputed plaintiffs' 
right to store water on the City's land. The reservoir, its impounding dikes, and related 
facilities have existed for approximately 50 years without challenge from the owners of the 
land encumbered by the Blue Lakes Reservoir easement. 
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5. The easement for Blue Lakes Reservoir was initially created by two separate 
deeds in 1946. One deed was executed by Keith Brown and Elba Brown as grantors, 
and the other deed by Penina Anderson. The easement grantee was Paul Wrathall. The 
easement has been a matter of public record continuously since March 6, 1946, the date 
of recording in the Tooele County Recorders Office. 
6. On May 14, 1946, Maxwell Johnson entered into an agreement with Paul 
Wrathall under which Maxwell Johnson acquired a right to store water in Blue Lakes 
Reservoir and an undivided one-half interest in the reservoir and easement to share and 
share alike together with Paul Wrathall. The agreement did not expand on the scope of 
the easement by creating an enlarged reservoir or in any other way increase the burden 
on the servient estate. 
7. The use of the Blue Lakes Reservoir as an irrigation and flood control 
reservoir required the construction of dikes-one known as the West Dike and the other 
as the North Dike. Construction took place in or about 1946 without objection from 
the servient estate owners. Design and construction plans of the Blue Lakes Reservoir 
were approved by the U. S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservancy Service and 
submitted to the office of the Utah State Engineer in 1946. Those plans identify Paul 
Wrathall and Max Johnson as the joint owners of the reservoir. Those plans have been 
on file with the State Engineer's office since 1946. 
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8. The area covered with water when the reservoir is at full capacity is 85 
acres, which is significandy less than the total 240 acres of land described in the recorded 
easements. 
9. Over the years, the Blue Lakes Reservoir was also known by the Grantsville 
community as the "Wrathall-Johnson Reservoir." 
10. In 1950 Maxwell Johnson's and Paul WrathalTs joint interest in the 
easement on the Brown and Anderson property for Blue Lakes Reservoir was affirmed in 
a decision of the Third District Court in and for Tooele County in Tohnson. et al v. 
Wrathall. et al? Civil No. 3559, as a part of a comprehensive dispute in which the court 
adjudicated water rights, rights-of-way, easements and other real property interests of 
multiple parties in the Grantsville area. Parties to the action included plaintiffs' father 
(Maxwell Johnson) and defendants' predecessors-in-interest (Brown and Anderson). 
11. Since at least as early as 1950 the reservoir existed as an improved and 
enlarged storage facility capable of collecting and storing water beyond the natural basin. 
12. In 1986 the Utah State Engineer, while conducting an inspection of the 
Blue Lakes Reservoir, noted certain deficiencies in the condition of the dikes which 
prompted the sending of written notification to plaintiffs as the known owners of the 
facility. Plaintiff Russell Johnson made the necessary repairs and filed an application to 
appropriate a water storage right, which was approved by the Utah State Engineer. 
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Thereafter, plaintiff followed all the statutory requirements for obtaining a certificate of 
appropriation on his storage water right. 
13. Defendants acquired their interest in the land encumbered by the Blue 
Lakes Reservoir in or about 1990, with actual knowledge of the existence of the Blue 
Lakes Reservoir and dikes, and actual knowledge of the deeded easement created in 1946. 
At the time of defendants' purchase, the only ditch connected to the Blue Lakes Reservoir 
was one which carried the storage water to the Johnson Ranch where the water had 
historically been used. 
14. Water has been stored in the Blue Lakes Reservoir continuously over the 
years since 1946. The timing of storage and the releases of water for flood control and 
irrigation use by plaintiffs' family has varied from year to year depending on water 
availability, climatic conditions and crop needs. The use of the reservoir was at all times 
open, adverse and under a claim of right by plaintiffs and their father. 
15. Defendants' claim that Arthur Higley stored water in Blue Lakes under a 
claim of right asserted by his brother, Rulon Higley, is not supported by credible 
evidence. 
16. Rulon Higley made no effort to use the reservoir, no effort to participate in 
the repairs performed by Russell Johnson, and he has never obtained a water storage 
filing from the State Engineer's office. His claim to an interest in the easement was not 
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made known until shortly before trial, and then only after being advised to do so by 
defendants' counsel. 
17. Rulon Higley owns land in Section 6 of Township 2 South, Range 5 West, 
SLB&M. He acquired his Section 6 land in 1966 by deed which does not mention the 
Blue Lakes Reservoir. The Blue Lakes Reservoir was never used to deliver water to 
Section 6 lands. It appears to this Court that defendants are merely using Rulon Higley 
to excuse Arthur Higley's interference with plaintiffs' storage waters. 
18. The only water right recognized by the State of Utah that authorizes the 
storage of water in the Blue Lakes Reservoir is on record with the State Engineer's office 
as Water Right No. 15-3146 and is held in the name of Russell Johnson. This is a vested 
water right evidenced by a Certificate of Beneficial Use issued by the State Engineer. 
19. Plaintiffs have expended money and effort in reliance on the continued use 
of the Blue Lakes Reservoir. This storage facility provides great benefits to the plaintiffs' 
farming operation. 
20. Defendant Arthur Higley placed water into the Blue Lakes Reservoir 
beginning in December 1995. He has had no water right and no easement right to do 
so. His use of the reservoir deprived plaintiffs of needed storage capacity for their 
appropriated waters. 
21. In the summer of 1996 Arthur Higley interfered with plaintiffs' right to 
store water by blocking plaintiffs' irrigation ditch and by causing a new large canal to be 
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excavated into the Blue Lakes Reservoir with the intent of short circuiting the storage 
waters away from plaintiffs' lands. Under the direction of Arthur Higley, plaintiffs' 
storage water was drained from the Blue Lakes Reservoir in August 1996. 
22. Plaintiffs' have been subjected to repeated flooding events for several years 
as a result of attempts by Arthur Higley to irrigate during the winter with water which 
originates from a series of eight artesian wells. Arthur Higley is a joint owner in a water 
right that provides for the use of water from the artesian wells during the irrigation 
season. The State Engineer has denied his applications to appropriate, divert and use 
water from the wells during the non-irrigation season. Arthur Higley knew of the 
repeated yearly flooding and took no action to remedy flooding until 1995. 
23. To resolve the flooding, defendant Arthur Higley requested from Russell 
Johnson an easement across his property to replace the open ditches with a buried 
pipeline. Russell Johnson granted the easement in 1995 and included Arthur Higley, 
Steven St. Clair and Rulon Higley as grantees at the behest of Arthur Higley. 
24. Arthur Higley took responsibility for determining the appropriate size of the 
water pipeline to safely carry the full flow of water so as to prevent flooding. 
25. In August 1995, acting on behalf of himself and without including the 
other two pipeline easement owners, Arthur Higley applied to the Utah State Engineer 
for the right to use 10 cubic feet per second of water from the artesian wells during the 
winter months. The application was rejected by the Utah State Engineer, but defendant 
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Arthur Higley took no action to discontinue his use of the well water during the winter 
months. 
26. Plaintiffs were flooded in January of 1996 and March 1996 as a result of 
the failure of Arthur Higley to properly maintain his ditch works and a pipeline which he 
participated in constructing near plaintiffs' corrals and haystack yard. 
27. Plaintiffs' lands were flooded from November 1996 through the summer of 
1997 as a result of improper sizing of the pipeline which was constructed pursuant to the 
1995 easement, and the unauthorized use of artesian well water during the winter. 
28. Plaintiff Russell Johnson immediately notified defendant Arthur Higley of 
the flooding. After receiving such notice, Arthur Higley chose to take no action to 
alleviate the flooding for several months, and he chose not to notify the other two 
pipeline easement grantees. \ 
29. Prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff Russell Johnson made 
several demands upon Arthur Higley for him to control his water and, if necessary, cap 
the artesian wells to prevent winter flooding of plaintiffs' land. Those requests were 
ignored. 
30. It is physically possible and not unreasonably burdensome to cap the 
artesian wells to avoid inflicting damage to plaintiffs' land. 
31. The proximate cause of the November 1996 flooding event includes: (1) 
Arthur Higley's use of water during the winter without a valid water right to do so; (2) 
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Arthur Higley having sized the pipeline too small to handle the flows; and (3) Arthur 
Higleys failure to take any action to remedy the flooding after having been notified. 
32. The proximate cause of the January 1996 and March 1996 flooding events 
includes: (1) the failure to maintain the Higley ditch in which Arthur Higley owns a one-
sixth interest; and (2) the improper sizing of the pipeline in which Arthur Higley was a 
participant. 
33. No actions of plaintiffs were a contributing cause to their flood damages, 
and they did not fail to mitigate their damages. 
34. Plaintiffs have been damaged as follows: 
(a) In the amount of $2,702 for the January and March 1996 flooding 
event. 
(b) In the amount of $5,200 for the November 1996 flooding event. 
(c) In the amount of $3,000 for the loss of storage water and 
interference with their rights in the Blue Lakes Reservoir. 
35. Plaintiffs reasonably apprehend that defendant Arthur Higley will continue 
to negligently or intentionally discharge water onto their lands and continue to interfere 
with their rights in the Blue Lakes Reservoir unless enjoined by this Court. 
36. At no time did plaintiffs interfere with defendants' ditch works or water 
related facilities, or wrongfully take any of defendants1 water. 
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37. Defendants failed to produce Steven St. Clair to corroborate defendants3 
testimony regarding the sizing of the pipe and construction of the pipeline through 
plaintiffs3 property. 
38. Defendants failed to offer any credible evidence in support of their 
counterclaims. 
39. To the extent the oral testimonies in this action were conflicting as to 
material issues of fact, on balance the Court finds the testimonies of plaintiffs' witnesses 
more credible. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
40. The easement for storage of water in the Blue Lakes reservoir is a valid and 
existing encumbrance on defendants' land. 
41. The agreement entered into between Maxwell Johnson and Paul Wrathall is 
valid. The agreement did not enlarge upon the scope of the easement or increase the 
burden on the land encumbered by the easement. Those contractual rights have not 
been abandoned by the plaintiffs. 
42. The scope of the storage easement granted by deed is not limited to the 
natural reservoir basin. The construction of the several dikes without objection from the 
servient estate owners, and the long-standing use of the reservoir with the dikes in place is 
compelling evidence supporting a construction of the deed in favor of plaintiffs. 
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43. Plaintiffs have expended money and effort in reliance on the continued use 
of the Blue Lakes Reservoir, and the reliance was reasonable under the circumstances. 
44. By purchasing the land encumbered by the Blue Lakes Reservoir, 
defendants obtained no better rights than their predecessors-in-interest owned. 
45. Defendants' lands are subject to the Blue Lakes Reservoir created by deed in 
1946. 
46. Defendants as successors-in-interest to the parties in Tohnsoa et al v. 
Wrathall et al? Civil No. 3559, are bound by that courts' findings and conclusions related 
to confirming the rights of Maxwell Johnson in the Blue Lakes Reservoir. 
47. Defendants' claim that the decision in Tohnson, et al v. Wrathall. et al 
adjudicated an abandonment of the Blue Lakes Reservoir easement is without merit, and 
defendants' claim that an abandonment occurred as a result of non-use after 1950 is 
likewise without merit. 
48. To the extent that plaintiffs' rights might otherwise be limited, plaintiffs 
acquired an easement through prescriptive use over a period of 50 years, which entitles 
them to the full use and enjoyment of the Blue Lakes Reservoir and related facilities for 
the storage of water up to the full capacity as presently constructed with its dikes and 
outlet works. 
49. Defendants are not bona fide purchasers for value without knowledge of 
plaintiffs' interest in the right to store water in the Blue Lakes Reservoir. Defendants had 
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actual notice, constructive notice and a duty to inquire into the existence of plaintiffs' 
rights to the Blue Lakes Reservoir. 
50. Arthur Higley wrongfully and tortiously interfered with plaintiffs' easement 
rights by preventing plaintiffs from storing water, and either converted plaintiffs' water in 
storage to his own use or caused the storage water to run to waste. For this, Arthur 
Higley is liable to plaintiffs in the amount of $3,000. 
51. Arthur Higley is a joint owner of the artesian wells which flow uncontrolled 
and caused the flooding of plaintiffs' land. Once notified of the flooding by plaintiffs, 
Arthur Higley had both a duty to take reasonable steps to stop the flooding. Arthur 
Higley breached this duty. 
(a) With respect to the January 1996 and March 1996 flooding events, 
Arthur Higley's liability is predicated on his one-sixth joint ownership interest in the 
artesian wells. Arthur Higley is liable to plaintiffs in the amount $450. 
(b) With respect to the November 1996 flooding event, Arthur Higley 
is solely liable. Arthur Higley is liable to plaintiffs in the amount of $5,200. 
52. No conduct of defendant Susan Higley contributed to plaintiffs' damages, 
and any damage claims against her should be dismissed. 
53. With respect to further interference with the Blue Lakes Reservoir and 
further flooding, there is no adequate remedy at law, and plaintiffs would be faced with 
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the need to bring multiple suits to address the harm; therefore, plaintiffs are entitled to 
injunctive relief. 
54. It is reasonable and proper to enjoin defendants from interfering with 
plaintiffs' free and full use of the Blue Lakes Reservoir, its dikes and related facilities. 
55. It is reasonable and proper to enjoin the defendants from diverting more 
water from the artesian wells during the non-irrigation season than can be carried by the 
existing 20-inch pipeline crossing plaintiffs3 property. The pipeline is undersized to carry 
the flow from the wells. The capping or the placing of valves on the wells is under the 
jurisdiction of the Utah State Engineer. 
56- It is reasonable and proper to enjoin defendants from discharging any water 
which they own or have a right to control onto plaintiffs' land. 
57. Defendants failed to meet their burden of proof on any and all affirmative 
defenses and cross-claims in this action. 
58. Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of reasonable costs incurred in this action. 
TUDGMENT 
1. Defendants are permanently enjoined from in any way interfering with 
plaintiffs' free and full use of the Blue Lakes Reservoir, its dikes and related facilities. 
2. Defendants are permanently enjoined from diverting more water from the 
artesian wells during the non-irrigation season than can be carried by the existing 20-inch 
pipeline crossing plaintiffs3 land. 
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3. Defendants are permanently enjoined from discharging any water which 
they own or have a right to control onto plaintiffs3 land. 
4. Plaintiffs are awarded damages of $8,650 against defendant Arthur Higley. 
5. Plaintiffs3 damage claims against defendant Susan Higley are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
6. Defendants3 counterclaims are dismissed with prejudice. 
7. Plaintiffs are awarded reasonable costs incurred in this action. 
DATED this ^ d a y d£^F/z^u^A^ 199£_. 
BY THE COURT: 
(HJ^^ /#-U\dk<^c& 
A. Rokich 
District Court Judge 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Beverly Riemann, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law offices of 
Williams & Hunt, attorneys for plaintiffs herein; that she served the attached proposed 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT in Case 
No. 970300044 before the Third Judicial Distria Court for Tooele County upon the 
parties listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed 
to: 
Counsel for Defendants 
B. Kent Ludlow 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 12th day of 
December, 1997. 
'<<mJUv 
Beverly Riem^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 12th day of December, 
1997. 
Notary Pubic H 
!5&£ 200 s*** *oo i Notary Public 
Sat Ufc»Ci*y,uitf, $4111 J ; 
° * ! * " 13,199* | 
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